The Revival of the Athenian Political and Military Morale in the Time of Lycurgus

Abstract: Through a thorough examination of the aspects associated with Athenian Democracy, the present paper aims at highlighting the motives as well as the consequences of the reforms of Eubulos from the deme Probalinthos, mainly regarding the theorik fund, and of Lycurgus from the deme Boutadai. The Athenian citizens, after 338 BCE, experience a new promising era for their state under Lycurgus as ὁ ἐπί τῇ διοίκησι τῶν χρημάτων (in charge of the financial administration), who, through his extensive building policy in Attica, revives the political and military morale of the Athenian citizens, preparing them to defend once more the Greeks’ autonomy—by opposing the Macedonians, who were conceived as barbarians, and to reclaim consequently their lost hegemony in the Greek world.

Keywords: Eubulos; Lycurgus; Democracy; Chaeronea; theorik fund; Pnyx; building policy; political identity; national consciousness.

INTRODUCTION

Ἀρχαῖοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων πρῶτον· δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ πρέπον δὲ ἀμα ἐν τοῖς τούτῳ τῶν τις μνῆμας διδοθαί. τὴν γὰρ χάριν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ οἰκούντες διαδοχὴ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων μέχρι τοῦ ἔλευθεραν δὲ ἀρετὴν παρέστασαν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἐκέρτο εὔπαινο λεία αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἕτεροι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτισάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξασθαι ὅσην ἐκέμμην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπέρ σοι παστερέαν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἐκέρτο εὔπαινο λεία αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἕτεροι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτισάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξασθαι ὅσην ἐκέμμην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπέρ σοι παστερέαν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἐκέρτο εὔπαινο λεία αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἕτεροι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτισάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οitoris ἐδέξασθαι ὅσην ἐκέμμην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπέρ σοι παστερέαν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἐκέρτο εὔπαινο λεία αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἕτεροι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτισάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξασθαι ὅσην ἐκέμμην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπέρ σοι παστερέαν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἐκέρτο εὔπαινο λεία αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἕτεροι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτισάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξασθαι ὅσην ἐκέμμην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπέρ σοι παστερέαν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἐκέρτο εὔπαινο λεία αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἕτεροι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτισάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξασθαι ὅσην ἐκέμμην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπέρ σοι παστερέαν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἐκέρτο εὔπαινο λεία αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἕτεροι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτισάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξασθαι ὅσην ἐκέμμην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπέρ σοι παστερέαν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἐκέρτο εὔπαινο λεία αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἕτεροι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτισάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξασθαι ὅσην ἐκέμμην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπέρ σοι παστερέαν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἐκέρτο εὔπαινο λεία αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἕτεροι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτισάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξασθαι ὅσην ἐκέμμην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπέρ σοι παστερέαν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἐκέρτο εὔπαινο λεία αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἕτεροι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτισάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξασθαι ὅσην ἐκέμμη

1 All provided dates are BCE.
2 I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that they should have the honor of the first mention on an occasion like the present. They dwelt in the country without break in the succession from generation to generation, and handed it down free to the present time by their valor. And if our more remote ancestors deserve praise, much more do our own fathers, who added to their inheritance the empire which we now possess, and spared no pains to be able to leave their acquisitions to us of the present generation. Lastly, there are few parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by those of us here, who are still more or less in the vigor of life, while the mother country has been furnished by us with everything that can enable her to depend on her own resources whether for war or for peace.
In this brief passage from his famous Epitaph in honor of the dead Athenians of the year 431/0, Pericles, before praising the power of Democracy, highlights some of the most important aspects of the Athenian political life and identity: autochthony, the value of freedom, bravery, honour of the great ancestors, the construction of their hegemony in the Aegean, the military might, the fighting against the barbarians and the other rival Greek city-states. As the present paper aims to demonstrate, the building policy of Eubulos and later on of Lycurgus has as its main purpose to boost the democratic constitution and the military confidence of the Athenian citizens, highlighting the exact same aspects of their political identity, in order Athens to claim once more the hegemony of the Greek world, which seems to have been lost forever after its humiliating defeat at Chaeronea by the Macedonians. Before analyzing though the remarkable financial recovery of Athens in the decades of 350’s and 40’s, associated with Eubulos and his reform regarding the theoric fund, as well as the political rebirth of the Athenian state in the decades of 330’s and 20’s (until the Lamian War) under the administration of Lycurgus, it is highly important that we have a brief overview on the sociopolitical circumstances of the fourth century Athens.

Even though Athens enjoys a new brief promising period in the early 4th century with Conon and the Corinthian war, it will not succeed though to reestablish its position as a ruler in the Greek world; a role that is preserved by the Spartans until 371/0 and the battle of Leuctra, and then briefly by the Thebans. 6 The foundation of the second Athenian League in 378/7 4 does not have the expected results. Even though the Athenians expect this time to enjoy the unanimous support of their allies, through their admittedly more moderate –in comparison to the fifth century- foreign policy, the social war breaks out in 356/5. 5 There is no official end of this second league until 338/7, but the Athenians now face great financial and military losses that prevent them of even hoping of reestablishing their hegemony in the Greek world after 355.

The financial situation in Athens is difficult, considering moreover the participation of the Athenians in the third sacred war during the years 357-352. 6 However, the biggest problems within the Athenian state lie in the extensive disappointment of its citizens, caused by their failing military enterprises in the attempts to reclaim the hegemony of the Greek world since 394, as well as the gradual abandonment of their aggressive foreign policy. Moreover, the rich Athenian citizens can no longer stand the military expenses, the so-called εἰσφορά, 7 and above all the liturgies, the τριηραρχίες, meaning the obligation to fully equip a trireme. 8 The law of Periander in 358/7 on the τριηραρχικά, συμμορία 9 does not reduce dramatically the extensive -to all the social classes- abandonment of political ambition for reclaiming the former Athenian military glory.

In around 355, two representative works make their appearance in the Athenian political stage, expressing the common -by that time- opinion regarding the policy Athens should follow from now on. There are no others than the Περί Εἰρήνης (on Peace) of Isocrates, suggesting to the Athenians to abandon their hegemonic claims and to enjoy prosperity within their own city-state, by remaining militarily defensive, 10 and the Περί Πόρων ή Προοδότου (Ways and Means; on Revenues) of Xenophon, which suggests to the Athenians measures for increasing the incomes of their state. The most important financial proposition of Xenophon, which becomes an actual reality in Athens during the following years and leads to prosperity, is the extensive exploitation of the rich silver mines of the Laurion/Thorikos region. 11

EUBULOS PAYING THE WAY TO LYCURGUS’ POLICY

Within this historical framework, Eubulos, 12 from the deme Probalianthos, passes his law regarding the so-called theoric fund. 13 The fundamental idea upon which Eubulos, with the help of his friends, bases his reform is the abandonment of the aggressive foreign policy and the concentration of the Athenian state on its internal prosperity, maintaining peace with the Macedonians. He does manage an impressive financial, for the standards of the 4th century, prosperity, 14 when he succeeds a law to be passed, which gives the right to the theoric fund to receive the surpluses of the Athenian incomes. 15 Until the time of Themistocles, the Athenians used to share the surplus among them. In 483 though, the surplus of the mines of Laurion was used for the expansion of the Athenian fleet that finally defeated the Persians. It seems that it became ever since a common

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1 THOMSEN 1964, 243-245.  
3 Twenty teams, consisted of the 1200 richest citizens, who would from no bear the costs of equipping a trireme. On Periander’s law as well as Demosthenes’ triarchic law (18.105) see CANGEVARO 2013: 267-274; KREVSEIDAS 2012, 26-23; McDOWELL 1966; BUSCHENBUSCH 1979; WALLACE 1989.  
5 On the analysis of Xenophon’s Poroi see in detail a forthcoming study of mine. On the Laurion mines see HOPPER 1953, 200-254; 1968, 393-326.  
6 On Eubulos and his financial policy see especially CAWKWELL 1963, 47-67 with further references; HINTZEN-BOHLEN 1997, 95-105; MOTZKI 1903.  
7 On dating the theoric fund in the time of Eubulos see Philochorus, [Plutarch], Moralia 1812f.  
8 On dating the theoric fund in the time of Eubulos see Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 33; Suda α. σ. Ἑράκλειος βασιλεύως (6 1491 Adler), Scholia on Aeschines III, Κείσιππον 24 (65 Dills), 25; Theopompus E 99. See also Hesychius α. σ. Ἑράκλειος (6 2351 Late) who implies that there were theoric distributions earlier, while Diophanes was archon (in 395/4). The majority of historians nowadays accept the creation of the theoric fund by Eubulos, and not in the time of Pericles: i.e. BADIAN 1995, 100; BUCHANAN 1962, 53-56; CAWKWELL 1963, 55 fn. 53; FARAGUNA 1992, 208; ROSELLI 2009, 7. On the board of the θερικόν see Πτολ. 43.1, 47.2 and RHODES 1972, 235-240, 1993, 314-316.
unofficial practice for the Athenians to use this amount for their military enterprises, and finally in 378 Callistratos created an official army fund (στρατιωτικόν).

16 Theorik fund on the other hand, was the fund, the creation of which is dated in the fourth century, which paid grants to the Athenian citizens covering the cost of the theatre tickets at the major festivals. By receiving the surpluses, this fund could finance the poor citizens of Athens by ensuring in fact their sustenance.

17 Eubulos enjoyed an extensive support, not only by the rich citizens that could now concentrate on their prosperity by not financing military activities of their state, but most importantly by the poor Athenians that saw their basic financial needs covered by the state. The Athenians at that time also created a body responsible for the theoretik fund, the so-called άξιωματούχοι επί το θεωρικού, in which ten members would be elected every four years. Eubulos and his friends succeed to be elected several times as άξιωματούχοι, and, through this office, Eubulos manages to promote his plans for internal prosperity by controlling actually the whole financial administration of the city. As Aeschines mentions: "Because of your thrust in Eubulos, those elected to control the theoretik fund, before Hegemon's law was passed, controlled various financial offices, were responsible for various building projects, and had virtually the whole financial administration of the city." In other words, as controllers of the theoretik fund, Eubulos and his friends could spend the substantial surplus for purposes that only they approved.

18 Eubulos supports an extensive building policy in Athens and Piraeus, which we will see later in detail in the time of Lycurgus, as we cannot be sure not only of when exactly the related to this policy archaeological material is dated, but also because of the fact that only in the time of Lycurgus this building program is expanded and completed. The most important measure though of Eubulos, as Deinarchus and of course Aeschines inform us, is the creation of triremes as well as of ship-sheds and the so-called σκευοθήκη (storehouse) of Philon. measures that support the recovery of the Athenian fleet.

19 In October 340 Athens finally declared war against Philip, after Demosthenes' abetment. In 338 the Athenians and the Thebans fought the Macedonians in Chaeronea. The terms of treaty on behalf of the victorious Macedonians in 337 were as mild as could be for the Athenians. The Scholia on Demosthenes 3 (Olynthiakos 3), 29; IG II 1627, 352-354. However, in the time of Eubulos the piracy continued to be an obstacle in the free flow of the commercial traffic in the Aegean; see Aeschines 2.12; Demosthenes 18.145, 23.166 [Demosthenes] 7.2, 12.3-5, 13.

20 In the years 357-354 the Macedonian King drives away the Athenians from the lands next to his kingdom. The loss of Amphipolis in 358/7 made it clear that the Macedonians threaten directly the vital Athenian interests. Athens avoids fighting back the Macedonians and in 346 the Athenians make peace with Philip, the so-called Peace of Philokrates. It is the time when Eubulos is in charge in Athens, and stresses constantly that Athens must maintain a defensive position. Demosthenes does not succeed, despite his three, in total, Olynthiakoi speeches, to convince the Athenian demos to transfer the surpluses to the army fund in order to intervene to the offensive policy of Philip, not at least until 341/0.

21 We could say that the law of Eubulos was a disaster for Athens, at least as far as its foreign policy is concerned. This law may have secured some peaceful years and a temporal prosperity in the state, and also provided to some extent the means to Lycurgus to follow his extensive building policy later, but it actually opened up the doors for Philip's parade towards southern Greece. It was during this critical moment that Philip could be stopped, but the powerful military Athenian machinery was chained by Eubulos' reform. Any rhetor that was willing to suggest the use of the surpluses for military activities against Philip would automatically face the threat of a γραμμή παρανόμου. Therefore, Athens should remain defensive while -in the meantime- Philip marched and expanded over Greek territories. Therefore, the Athenians in the time of Eubulos seem to turn their back to one of their greatest political virtues, dictated by the democratic constitution: the defense of liberty and autonomy, not only for themselves, but most importantly for the other Greek states, whose interests Athens defended from the early fifth century by opposing the Persian Empire.

THE ATHENIAN DEFEAT AT CHAERONEA

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Athenians had of course to dissolve their naval league, which had lost any power whatsoever by that time, and to join the Corinthian one, but the Macedonians were not going to intervene to the internal affairs of the Athenian state. Democracy was not doubted, the Athenians would maintain their clerouchies in Samos, Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros as well as the administration of the sanctuary of Apollo in Delos. The Athenians also received the region of Oropos, which belonged before to Thebes. However, as the historian Justin stresses: For the whole of Greece, this day [when Philip prevailed at Chaeronea] marked the end of its glorious supremacy and its ancient independence. And yet, the Athenians will once more, for the last time, try to reclaim their former supremacy, defending their political independence that will be inevitably -sooner or later- doubted by the Macedonians.

THE REVIVAL OF THE ATHENIAN MORALE UNDER LYCURGUS

After the Athenian defeat at Chaeronea Lycurgus is in charge of the financial administration in Athens, as ὁ ἐπί τῇ διοίκησιν τῶν χρημάτων (in charge of the financial administration), initiating a massive building program across Attica. In the period ca. 336-324 he, the son of Lykophron, from the deme Boutadai and the priestly clan of Eteoboutadai, is elected to supervise the public finances of Athens.

Athens under the administration of Lycurgus experiences its so-called "silver age", as it has often been stressed, by comparison with the golden age of Pericles. Through his extensive building program, he makes so-to-say injections of confidence to the most crucial aspects of the Athenians' political consciousness, after the humiliating defeat in Chaeronea, and promotes extensively the Athenian collective as well as cultural memory. Pnyx, the place where the Athenians citizens as a whole are gathered in order to make political decisions in a sovereign way, is remodeled. The first phase of Pnyx is securely dated after the reform of Kleisthenes in the year 501/0. The construction of Pnyx constitutes one of the most important ways the Athenians expressed, through their building policy in the late sixth century, the fact that the demos as a whole -from now on- the ruler in the decision-making process in the Athenian state. The second phase of Pnyx is dated in 404/3 during the reign of the thirty tyrants. As Plutarch (Themistocles) informs us: Therefore it was too that the bema [speaker's platform] in the Pnyx which had stood so as to look off the sea, was afterward turned by the Thirty Tyrants so as to look inland, because they thought that rule of the sea fostered Democracy, whereas farmers were less likely to be bothered by Oligarchy. Here it is stressed a focal democratic idea: Democracy is strictly connected with the military strength, and especially the naval power. That's why perhaps the thirty tyrants turned the position of the bema as to look the inland. This inevitably reminds us of the reform of Eubulus, who turned the expectations; second, the "national" consciousness as a vital part of the political identity and the ideal of fighting "barbarism" (on the case of the Athen see in detail KRIKONA 2016; 2018); third, the ideological link between military might and democratic constitution as well as the political connotations of the religious practices under Democracy (see in detail KRIKONA 2016). And forth, the crisis of the democratic constitution in the fourth century: there is an underlying crisis, associated mainly with the Athenian democrats themselves, even though the democratic constitution -more than ever- is fully functional according to a well-reorganized system (on the way fourth century Athenian Democracy works see in detail BLECKEKEN 1987, 257-283; EDER 1995; ENGELS 1992, 5-29; HANSEN 1991; MOSSÉ 1973). There is a deep political disunity, not only because of the rival between democrats and oligarchs, which from the year 403 onwards actually ceases (mainly because after the thirty tyrants' regime nobody active in politics can openly admit to being an opponent of Democracy), but because of the two opposite sides, those in favor of the Macedonians, i.e. Aeschines; Isocrates, and the making of peace and those against them, i.e. Demosthenes and Hyperides (on the politicians of the fourth century see HANSEN 1989, 1-24, 25-33; HARRIS 1995; KNOX 1985, 132-161; MITCHEL 1970, 11-27; OBER 1989, 112-118; PERLMAN 1963, 327-355; WIRTH 1999b), and consequently in favor of an aggressive foreign policy and the reestablishment of Athens in its former glorious military status as leader defender of the Greek autonomy against the common barbarian enemy (in this case the Macedonians). The Athenians had lost most of their former glory, such as political confidence and courage; they have become defensive, abandoning their former aggressive foreign policy. In other words, the Athenians are not willing to defend their democratic values, especially the notion of freedom, which is strictly associated with their autonomy, and the autonomy of the rest Greek world. In addition, the political theories on the revival of the ancestral constitution that try to undermine the power of Democracy of their time worsen the extensive common feeling of political disappointment among the Athenians, who fail to revive the glory of their past (i.e. when they established their second naval league without regaining the hegemony in the Greek world; see CAWKWELL 1981). Within this political framework, one would expect that Chaeronea would be the gravestone of any further ambitious political hope. As MITCHEL (1970, 9-10) so vividly stresses: The Athenians were now truly alone, with Thebes destroyed and Sparta knocked out-alone with their bad consciences and with ever increasing feelings of frustration and helplessness in the face of the waxing power of Macedon.

See DÜRBACH 1890; HUMPHREYS 1985, 199-252; MITCHEL 1970, 11-13. For the Lycurgan era and his program see in general COLIN1928, 189-200; DÜRBACH 1890; HINTZEN-BOHLEN 1997, 105-109; JOHNSON 1915, 424-452. See also [Plutarch], Moralia, 852b. Lycurgus will remain in charge of the financial administration for twelve years in total (see Diodorus 16.88.1; [Plutarch], Moralia 841b). An impressive growth of the annual revenue to the average of 1200 talons over these twelve years is noticed; see Andreades 1933: 377 ff. 4.


On the revenues of Athens in the time of Lycurgus see in detail BURKE 1985, 251-264; BURKE 2010, and especially 393 ff. with further bibliography.

In order to interpret properly the most important aspects of the building program of Lycurgus and the way he managed to revive the Athenian political and military morale of the Athenian citizens, we should bear in mind the following: first, the power of symbolism: all the public monuments in the antiquity, and especially in the classical period of Greece, convey the ideology of the citizens of a polis; in other words they are symbols of the way the ancient ones perceived their political Self. Through its building constructions, a political body projects its self-image and also its political claims. Therefore, a monument not only depicts the past, as a pillar of the political identity in a city-state, and functions as "the physical construction of memory within a community" (SCOTT 2013, 8), but also articulates political beliefs and
Athenians' attention into the inside of their state. Of course, Eubulos' intentions were different from those of the tyrants, but the political result of his reform was to weaken the democratic morale of the Athenian citizens as well as their military confidence and ambition.

In the time of Lycurgus41 Pnyx is enlarged, from ca. 2600 m² to ca. 5550 m² and it can now host max. ca. 13,500 citizens (in comparison to the ca. 7000 of the phase II). Moreover, a large stepped speakers' platform (bema) is quarried out of the ridge at the southwest. The auditorium is supported by a large curved retaining wall, consisted of massive trapezoidal blocks, some of the biggest ever quarried in Athens, and two stoas also are constructed on the ridge above, but they are never finished.42 This astonishing remodeling of Pnyx in the time of Lycurgus comes as an additional proof that Democracy during his time, not only is not in decline, as it was traditionally believed,43 but is better organized and further developed. In this way Lycurgus encourages his fellow Athenians to participate more actively in the decision making process. Moreover, in 337/6 the Athenian Nomotetheai pass a law against tyranny that guarantees immunity for anyone who would kill people who would be plotting to overthrow the Democracy and establish tyranny in the city. Two copies are inscribed beneath reliefs of the personified Demokratia crowing the demos, and these stelai, the so-called Eukrates stelai (named after Eukrates Aristodemou, who proposed it), are installed at the entrances to both the Areos Pagos and the Ecclesia.44

In addition, from 333/2 onwards a statue of Demokratia stands before the Bouleuterion.45 Moreover, the monument of the Eponymous heroes is relocated from the southwest corner of the Agora in the third quarter of the fourth century and stands until now (only the foundations) just across from the Metroon (archive building) and the Bouleuterion.46 The monument reflects the tribal structure, initiated by Kleisthenes in the late sixth century, who had managed to

41 If of course we accept the year ca. 335 as a terminus post quem for the third phase of Pnyx, advocated by Thomson and others.
42 On the third phase of Pnyx see HANSEN 1983, 1-20; 1989, 129-141; 1996; KOVRVOUNOTES/THOMPSON 1932, 90-127; MCDONALD 1943; ROTROFF/CAMP 1996, 263-294; THOMPSON/SCHRANTZ 1943, 269-301; THOMPSON 1982, 133-147. In the third century onwards the Athenian citizens prefer to gather regularly at the theatre of Dionysus, and not on the Pnyx hill, where it is used once in a year by the electoral assembly only; see PULYX 8.133.
43 i.e. by FINLEY 1973, 49-50.
44 The decree that was found in the Agora stresses: In the archonship of Phrynichos, in the ninth prytany of Leontis for which Chairestratos, put the question to a vote; Eukrates, son of Aristodimos, of Piraeus, made the motion: with good fortune of the Demos of the Athenians, be it resolved by the Nomotetheai: If anyone rises up against the Demos for tyranny or join in establishing the tyranny or overthrow the Democracy of the Athenians or the Democracy in Athens, and he kills him who does any of these things shall be blameless. It shall not permitted for anyone of the Councilors of the Council from the Areos Pagos –if the Demos or the Democracy in Athens has been overthrown- to go up into the Areos Pagos or sit in the Council or deliberate about anything. If anyone –the Demos or the Democracy in Athens overthrown- of the Councilors of the Areos Pagos goes up into the Areos Pagos or sits in the Council or deliberates about anything, both he and his progeny shall be deprived of civil rights and his substance shall be confiscated and a tenth given to the Goddess. The secretory of the Council shall inscribe this law on two stelai of stone etc… (Agora I 6524); on the law of Eukrates see ENGLS 1988, 181-209; RICHARDSON 2003, 332-337.
45 See RAUBITSCHEK 1962, 238-243. The cult of Demokratia must have been introduced in Athens after the restoration of Democracy in 403 with annual sacrifices on the 12th of Boedromion; see DEUBNER 1932, 39.
46 AP, 53-4; PAUSANIAS 1.5.5 and SHEAR 1970, 145-222, especially 181-186.

This Neoptolemos from 50 Eukrates see ENGELS 1988, 181-209; RICHARDSON 2003, 332-337. The monument consists of a long base carrying the bronze statues of the ten heroes after whom the ten Athenian tribes were named. The base of the monument serves also as a public notice board, with announcements concerning members of a given tribe posted on the face of the base beneath the statue of the hero. The political message this monument carries hardly needs any further explanation.

These above-mentioned actions in the time of Lycurgus aim directly at making the Athenian citizens remember the power of their constitution and the power of being politically active. If the Athenians are politically conscious again, in other words if they believe once more in their Democracy and the need of its protection, they will be ready to reclaim the rule in the Aegean, in order to protect their freedom, and consequently the autonomy of the rest Greek world, as they did in the early fifth century.

However, Lycurgus promotes also an extensive building program concerning the religious ritual and practices throughout Attica. At his time, the temple of Apollon Patroos (ancestral) is built in its present form, next to the temple of Zeus Eleutherios.48 A monumental statue of Apollo dressed as a kithara player was found nearby. It is presumably the one Pausanias saw, done by Euphranor.49 According to [Plutarch],50 Lycurgus concerns himself with an altar of Apollo in the Agora, as he made a proposal to crown Neoptolemos, son of Antikles, and to set up a likeness of him because he offered to gild the altar of Apollo in the Agora in accordance with an oracle of the god. This Neoptolemos from the deme Melite, friend of Lycurgus, is associated with other religious dedications and public works. A relief of a scene in the cave of Pan, found south of the Agora, carries his name as dedicater. He also finances the reconstruction of the temple of Artemis Aristoboule,51 the meaning of which must be interpreted in conjunction with the old temple that was erected by Themistocles after Salamis but destroyed by the Athenians after Themistocles' ostracism.

At this point we should highlight the meaning of Patroos as part of Apollo's identity. According to Arpokration, the Athenians worship Apollo as Patroos, because he was father of Ion. When Ion was installed in Attica, according to Aristotle, the Athenians were named Ionians and gave the name Patroos to Apollo.52 If we want to have a closer look at it, we would say that the Ionian genos was an ethnos that was originally Pelasgian, but became more Hellenic over time than the Dorian genos which was a Hellenic ethnos. The Athenians, a formerly Pelasgian population, became Ionian (and thus eventually Hellenic) due to the arrival of Ion Athens.53 But why Lycurgus initiates the construction of Apollo Patroos

47 On the selection of the ten eponymous heroes see PARKER 1996, 172 and In. 59.
48 [Plutarch], Moralia 843f. For the temple see THOMPSON 1937, 77-115; on the altar specially 110-111; on the date of construction 102-104.
49 Pausanias 1.3.4.
50 Moralia 843f.
51 On the temple of Artemis see THREPSIADES/VANDERPOOL 1964: 26-36.
53 See Hdt. 1.56.2. Cf. Hdt. 1.57.3 on the Athenians, a formerly Pelasgian population, becoming Ionian thanks to Ion.
in the Agora? What aspect of the Athenian identity does he project? We have already seen how the Athenians defined and presented themselves in the early fifth century; they were Athenians and Ionians, and this syngeneia the Athenians had with the Ionians supported their claims for ruling in the Aegean. Moreover, the power of the notion of autochthony, along with other political notions, cults and festivals, was of great importance regarding the self-definition of the Athenian citizen, which supported Athens’ constitution and consequently the Athenian military supremacy. Having this cultural framework in mind, we should interpret some further initiations of Lycurgus. An acanthus column (of ca. 8.80 m high) is dedicated at this time (330-324) in the Apollo’s sanctuary at Delphi, depicting the so-called dancers, probably daughters of Cecrops or Erechtheus. The relation of Lycurgus’ clan with Erechtheus is well known, but Erechtheus, mythical King of Athens, is above all closely associated again with the myth of autochthony.

Lycurgus also supports, through his building policy, the two greatest Athenian festivals, celebrations of the whole citizenry, the Great Panathenaea and the Great Dionysia, by building a Panathenaic stadium (southeast of the city, across the Ilissos river) and by giving to the theatre of Dionysos its monumental form. In comparison to Pericles, Lycurgus encourages rich individuals to make contributions in exchange for honors, such as Neoptolemos, as we have already seen, Xenocles, epimelete of the Mysteries in 321/0, who built a bridge on the sacred way from Athens to Eleusis, and we have also a decree of Lycurgus honours Eudemus of Plataea in 329, who helped with the theatre and the stadium. Earlier, both the theatrical and athletic contests of Panathenaea seem to have been held in the Agora. Lycurgus also enhances the splendor of the Panathenaic procession, by arranging for gold and silver processional vessels, and gold adornment for one hundred basket bearers (kanephoroi). This expansion of the festival promotes the “national” consciousness of the Athenians, meaning the fact that are all equal Athenian citizens, as the Panathenaea constitutes the supreme ceremonial expression of their collective identity. The works in the Dionysian theatre includes the replacement of the temporal and small constructions of the fifth century, made of wood, by restructuring a grander and more elegant performance space as well as expanding the theatre’s seating capacity. By 346, in the time of Eubulos, there was a building

54 On the importance of the ancestral worship in the time of Lycurgus see also MITCHEL 1970, 44-45.
55 FD III 4 462.
56 BOUSQUET 1964, 655-675.
57 The hereditary priest of Poseidon-Erechtheus belonged always to the clan of Zonoboutadai: Lycurgus himself held this office; see [Plutarch], Moralia 843a-c, c-f.
59 See in detail PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE 1946, 134-174.
60 IG II 1191, 2840; Anthologia Palatina IX, 147.
61 Resolved by the people; Lycurgus, son of Lykophron of Boutadai proposed it. Since Eudemus in former times announced to the people a gift of 4,000 drachmas for the war if needed, and now has provided for the construction of the Panathenaeic stadium and the theatre a thousand pairs of draft animals and arranged all things for the procession before the Panathenaeas as he promised; resolved by the people to praise Eudemus (IG II 351).
62 Agora XVI 1997, 75. See also MITCHEL 1970, 36 fn. 136, 137.
63 IG II 435b; Æ, Justin, apparatus ludorum, Epit. 69; [Plutarch], Moralia 852c. (cf. 841 c-d).
64 Oscheus (ἀρχηγότατον), who organized the seats of honor (proedria) and managed also the general admission seats.

The efforts of Lycurgus to shape and control the Athenian theatrical heritage are not limited in the reconstruction of the Dionysian theatre. During his time, definitive texts of the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides are edited, as the product of the great Athenian past and its values, which should now remain permanently in the hands of the state. Lycurgus also initiates the construction of a bronze statue group of the great tragedians, which is erected and displayed at the eastern parodos of the Dionysian theatre: τὸν δὲ, ὥς χαλκᾶς ἕκκον ἀναθέτει τῶν θεάτην, Ἀισχύλου Σοφοκλέους Εὐριπίδου καὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας αὐτῶν ἐν κοινῷ γραμμάτειον φυλάττει καὶ τῆς πόλεως γραμματία παραναγνωσθηκόν τῶν ὑποκρινόμενων. Together the careers and lifetimes of these three tragedians go throughout the fifth century, during which the Athenian power was at its peak. This triad was therefore a group that was rooted in the idea of celebrating the Athenian identity as well as the past glorious days of the “Empire”. A further interpretation on the care Lycurgus showed regarding the Athenian theatre and its plays is provided by three of the most important orations of the year 330 (Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates, Aeschines’ Against Ctesiphon, and Demothenes’ On the Crown), which bear witness of a variety of ideas on the role of classical tragedy in the education of the demos, the importance of the Dionysian theatre as a historical monument to the festival’s past and the significance of the Great Dionysia as a means of Athenian self-presentation to both citizens and foreign visitors.

Lycurgus also plays a pivotal role in restoring the Acropolis’ golden Nikai statues, symbols of the great military past of Athens, which had been melted down for coins after the Peloponnesian war, as well as in constructing a monumental water clock (klepsydra) in the Agora, a parallel of which is to be found at Oropos in the sanctuary of Amphaios. As we have mentioned, Oropos after Chaeronea is under Athenian control and the Athenians, through this water clock parallel, and smaller building works in the sanctuary as well, confirm the current political state of affair, meaning that this area now belongs to them. In the time of Lycurgus the Asklepieion, adjacent to the Dionysian theatre, seems also to receive special attention as well as the temple of Zeus phratarios and Athena phratria, close to the Apollo Patroos’ temple in the Agora. This small temple, reconstructed in the time of Lycurgus, underlines the oldest aspect of the Athenian civic identity, the phratrias, which constituted the foundations of the citizenry’s organization (phratrias and orgeones) as probably the time of Draco.
In addition, Lycurgus continues the building program of Eubulos in Eleusis\textsuperscript{72}, and initiates also the construction of the Eleusinion in the southeast corner of the Agora, close to the Panathenaic Street.\textsuperscript{73} These works are associated with the strict ties Athens traditionally has with Eleusis. Lycurgus aims at projecting this close relation between Athens and the Eleusinian sanctuary, the Mysteries of which enjoy \textit{Panhellenic} prestige.\textsuperscript{74}

Therefore Lycurgus, through his extensive building program on the Pnyx hill, in the Agora and in other parts of the Athenian asty, revives the religious past of Athens, and projects aspects of its glorious political and military history as well, in order to strengthen the foundations of the democratic constitution, meaning the political equality and unity, and to remind also to the Athenian citizens their finest political qualities, the most important of which are confidence and bravery in the protection of their political and military freedom. He also promotes the "national" identity of the Athenians, which was associated in the past with the defence of all Greeks against the "barbarians", in order to underline the contrast to their current \textit{barbarian} tyrannical enemies, the Macedonians, whom they must now oppose.\textsuperscript{75}

Lycurgus aims also to provide the means through which the Athenians will be able to reclaim the role of the protector of the Greek states' autonomy. Towards this aim, he expands and completes the military projects in Piraesus, which Eubulus had initiated\textsuperscript{76}, meaning the replacement of ship sheds at the three harbors (Kantharos; Zea; Mounichia), which were dismantled by the thirty tyrants. In the year 325 the Athenians manage to have 390 ship-sheds in total.\textsuperscript{77} Lycurgus also completes the storehouse in Zea for the hanging tackle of the fleet, the ropes and the sails, designed by Philon of Eleusis (who was also responsible for the Prostoon of the Telesterion in Eleusis).\textsuperscript{78} Moreover, he initiates the construction of a temple of Zeus Soter and Athena Soteira,\textsuperscript{79} as protectors of the sea journeys, and he also introduces the quadriremes and quinqueremes (ships with more than one man too an oar, more stable but slower).\textsuperscript{80}

Lycurgus though, apart from the naval power of Athens, also takes care of the land army. Many boarder demes of Attica were already fortified by the time of the Peloponnesian war. All these forts and supplementary towers are now maintained and new buildings are built.

\textsuperscript{72} The Prostoon, meaning the construction of a huge marble porch on the east façade of the Telesterion, the architect of which was Philon, and the Ploutonion, sanctuary of Pluto (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1672, lines 168-187).

\textsuperscript{73} Pausanias 1.14.1.

\textsuperscript{74} Here we could recall the lost Panhellenic prestige that the Panathenaea had in the fifth century. On further cult changes such as the revival of the ancestral custom of collecting first fruits for Demeter see MITCHEL 1970, 45 with references.

\textsuperscript{75} According to course to the democratic narrative of that time, as it is mainly expressed through the \textit{Philippikoi} speeches of Demosthenes.


\textsuperscript{77} In 357/6 Athens possessed 283 ships (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1611 line 9); in 353/2: 349 (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1613, line 302); in 330/29: 392 (apart from the quadriremes; IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1627, line 269).

\textsuperscript{78} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1675.

\textsuperscript{79} HINTZEN-BOHLEN 1997, 18.

\textsuperscript{80} As protectors of the sea journeys, and he also introduces the quadriremes and quinqueremes (ships with more than one man too an oar, more stable but slower).

\textsuperscript{81} Furthermore, a two year program of military training for the youth of Athens, the ephebes, is formalized under Lycurgus (in 336/5).\textsuperscript{82} Young men of eighteen are expected to spend two years in military service. For part of that time they are also assigned to duty in one of the big forts. Lycurgus, as we have mentioned above, was very much concerned about the education of the Athenian citizens. Therefore, he initiates the renovation of the Lykeion,\textsuperscript{83} the construction of its Palaistra,\textsuperscript{84} and the plantation of trees in the area.\textsuperscript{85}

\textbf{THE MOTIVES OF LYCURGUS}

Lycurgus believes in the glory of the Athenian ancestral past, he actually idealizes it, one could say, and tries to bring it into his present in order to make democratic Athens powerful again. Therefore, there is a great distinction between his motives and the motives of the 4\textsuperscript{th} century political theorists (Plato; Aristotle; the author of \textit{Athenaion Politia}; Isocrates), who undermine Democracy by stressing to the Athenians the need of returning constitutionally to an ancestral glorious era, in order to justify actually the reestablishment of an oligarchic regime.\textsuperscript{86}

Secondly, Lycurgus continues -to some extent- the building program of Eubulos, but his goals are obviously different. Eubulos gives space to the Macedonian King to march and expand his power over Greek territories by making the Athenian citizens abandon the ideal of defending the Greek autonomy and freedom. This political ideal along with military confidence and strength, in other words a distinctive part of the Athenian political identity, is lost under Eubulos, who makes the majority of the citizens, the Thetes, military "nomb" by providing them the money, through the theoric fund, that would normally go to the stratitic fund. Lycurgus, on the contrary, has no other choice but to keep the peace with the Macedonians, waiting for the right time to strike back, by maintaining in the meantime Athens’ military preparedness and awakening the Athenian citizens’ democratic morale, through an extensive religious revival, in order for them to seize the opportunity, when it arises, to claim the hegemony of the Greek world once more. However, Eubulos indeed secures some necessary funds for the internal prosperity of Athens, but the Athenian political and therefore military ambitions are being forgotten under as well.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{82} CAMP 2001, 201-202 (in 2009 ed.).

\textsuperscript{83} See HABICH 1997, 10-12.

\textsuperscript{84} See in detail OBER 1985.

\textsuperscript{85} On the \textit{ephebeia} \textit{AP}, 42; see also in general FARAGUNA 1992, 274-280; HABICH 1997, 16-17; PELEKIDIS 1962. As RHODES 2011, 29 stresses: "the reform of the \textit{ephebeia} in the mid. 330s was a contribution to Athens' patriotic needs and its military needs".

\textsuperscript{86} Gymnasion for the education of the youth in the city; from 335 Aristotles has founded there his famous school. Pausanias 1.29.16.

\textsuperscript{87} Plutarch, \textit{Moralia} 843d.

\textsuperscript{88} Plutarch, \textit{Moralia} 841d.

\textsuperscript{89} See in detail FUKS 1971, 104-105; KRIKONA 2017 with further references; MOSSE 1978; RUSCHENBUSCH 1958.
his administration.

**EPILOGUE**

The Athenian political and military morale is revived in the time of Lycuragus, thanks to his extensive building program throughout Attica and beyond, and when Alexander dies, Athens rises against the Macedonians in order to reestablish her autonomy by force. The main fight takes place near Lamia in Thessaly, where the Macedonian cavalry finally prevails. Negotiations follow between Athens and Antipater, who demands the handing over of Demosthenes, who manages to escape from Athens, and flees to Calauria, where he prefers to commit suicide rather than fall in Macedonians’ hands, and also of Hyperides, who is sent to Macedon and being executed. Back in Athens, a Macedonian garrison is established as well as an oligarchic regime. According to Plutarch, the Athenians in 280/79 erect a bronze statue in honour of Demosthenes and his political confidence in defying the “Macedonian imperialism” with the following inscription: εἰπέρ ἵσεν γνώμην ῥήμην δημοσθένει τότες, οὔτοι ἐν ἔλληνων ἄρεις Μακεδών. The end of classical Athens has come; the end of the Greek polis as an autonomous, independent political unit has inevitably arrived.

**ABBREVIATIONS**

*Agora*: Inscriptions of the Athenian Agora


*FD*: Fouilles de Delphes


*IG*: Inscriptiones Graecae

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**ANDREADES** 1933  

**ANDREWES** 1974  

**BADIAN** 1995  

**BAYLISS** 2011  

**BLEICKEN** 1987  

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89 On the Lamian war see in general Diodorus XVIII 8-18.  
90 On the constitutional situation in Athens after the defeat in the Lamian war see BAYLISS 2011; RHODES 2011, 30.  
92 If only your strength had been equal, Demosthenes, to your wisdom, never would Greece have been ruled by a Macedonian Ares. On the statue see in detail WORTHINGTON 2013, 337-339.

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